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FROM DEEPENING ECONOMIC MALAISE TOWARD RENEWED DEVELOPMENT: 
Notes Toward African Agendas For Action
By Reginald Herbold Green
To plan is to choose,
Choose to go forward.
- President J. K. Nyerere
Pessimism of the intellect,
Optimism of the will.
- Antonio Gramsci
Our own reality - however fine and attractive 
the reality of others may be - can only be 
transformed by detailed knowledge of it, by 
our own sacrifices, by our own efforts...
- President Amilcar Cabral
SSA: The Failure of Development
To speak of development in respect to most Sub-Saharan African economies today 
is to speak of the past, not the present nor the currently forseeable future. 
The world's poorest region is rapidly becoming poorer - in a number of
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economies real resource availability measured in physical gross domestic 
product adjusted for terms of trade changes is lower than in 1970. In extreme 
cases - such as Zaire, Ghana and Uganda it is probably lower than in the early 
1960s. The present outlook in many cases is for "more of the same".
To describe SSA’s economic malaise in these macro (or mega) economic terms is 
necessary to holding any overview to manageable length. It is also grossly 
misleading and insufficiently disquieting because it fails to convey the very 
real human misery these figures inadequately symbolise. On the order of 100 
million human beings are seriously malnourished. Hundreds of thousands are 
dying prematurely annually from starvation and malnutrition caused reduction 
in resistance to disease. The human dimension of the crisis in SSA does not 
lie primarily in graphs of current account deficits or inflation rates but in 
rural clinics without drugs, schools without books, broken water systems 
without spare parts, workers without employment or access to productive self 
employment. Development is about human beings. They are its end and its 
actors, it evaluators and its justification. By that test, even more than by 
that of economic aggregates, SSA is failing.
For a majority of Sub-Saharan African economies and Sub-Saharan Africans the 
period since 1979 has been one of sustained or esculating crises and of 
stagnation or decline; for many it has been one of economic disaster. There 
are exceptions - of economies and of sub-classes, institutions and enterprises 
within them - and disagreement over degree and detail but the overall record 
of political economic unsuccess is both plain to read and broadly agreed.1
The record of the 1970s is less agreed because it is radically more diverse by 
country and by sub-period. While the overall record was poor (relative to the 
1960s and to the developing countries as a group) over 1970-73 and even worse
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over 1974-75, 1976-79 was - for Africa as a whole - a period of 6% annual
growth, well above its own historic average and somewhat above that of the
2developing countries as a group. Within that average there was wide
diversity with several secularly weak economies and also a general weakness in
the agricultural sector and especially the industrial and export crop
sub-sectors. A reading of continuous drift toward stagnation and decline, or
of a failure to overcome 1973-74 external shocks, in a majority of SSA
3economies is not historically accurate.
Similarly the basic causes of imbalance have not been massive increases in use 
of real resources nor general economic overheating. On the contrary in at 
least four fifths of SSA real private, consumption, fixed capital formation 
and public consumption per capita are significantly lower than in 1978 and in 
a substantial number than in 1970. Substantial falls in capital stock 
utilisation, not general overheating, characterise these economies. Inflation 
is prevalent because reduced import capacity has led to substantial 
devaluation and/or severe shortages and to sharply expanded government 
domestic borrowing requirements. Cost push inflation has resulted largely 
from reduced capacity utilisation and from the increased operating costs 
following inadequate maintenance of directly productive and infrastructural 
capital stock.
Certainly there have been cases of overheating and of unsustainable spurts of 
growth, e.g. Nigeria and Zimbabwe over 1980-81. Policy responses to reduced 
import capacity and other (e.g. drought) supply cuts without adequate 
attention to short term bridging finance and medium term restoration of supply 
have exacerbated imbalances and inflationary pressures. But the basic causes 
of the reversal of SSA's economic performance after 1979 are exogenous and 
originate in depressed supply not domestic or runaway demand initiated.
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Understanding that record is of importance not in belittling the generality or 
depth of the post 1979 decline, but in recognising that its direct causation 
and timing was largely exogenous and that a decline in national command over 
resources not a rapid increase in their expenditure was - except in a handful 
of cases - the driving force behind growing external and internal imbalances. 
Neither of these points alter the need for response including restructuring - 
1976-79 cannot be whistled back into being but they may well alter
perspectives on how the responses should be structured.
The prospects for the next decade on present trends and policies are but
little better than the record of the past half decade. On relatively
optimistic estimates as to the international economic and financial contexts,
the World Bank projects maximum likely growth rates for SSA more or less equal
to population growth for 1985-1995. Since the projections assume increased
shares of exports and of savings they really imply continued falls in real per
capita consumption on top of 15—20% (in several countries over 33% ) falls
since 1979 to levels near or below those of 1970. Again - as with the post
1979 record - there are national exceptions (e.g. Botswana, Cameroon) and a
margin of error in projections^ but - unless something is done, rapidly,
generally and backed by adequate resource allocations - there is nothing to
deny the general message of the forecasts that on present trends most SSA
7economies are, at best, bound for a decade of stabilised stagnation.
The Need To Act
The necessity and the urgency of action is proclaimed only too clearly by the 
1980-84 record and the 1985-95 .projections - at least by and for Africans and
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by and for any person or institution concerned, for whatever reason from 
direct self interest through believing "No man is an island... Ask not for 
whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee".
It is necessary:
a. to halt decline - in specific sectors, institutions and services, in 
the economy as a whole and in the conditions of life of Africans
O
(especially of the most vulnerable and severely affected groups );
b. to rehabilitate productive and service capacity and to reactivate it 
to restore losses; and
c. to restore a forward dynamic of development - which in the SSA 
context must include growth of productive forces generally, and of 
earned import capacity in particular, as a necessary (even if not a 
sufficient) condition.
Clearly this cannot be done in more than a few cases by continuing along
present or historic strategy and policy paths. Both the external and domestic 
environments have deteriorated too radically to permit holding on until things 
come right - an approach which was viable over 1973-75 but even then required 
substantial short term restriction of demand and/or substantial increases in 
external bridging finance to a degree that amounted to at least an interim and 
temporary startegy change. Further 1976-79 return to pre-1973 strategies has 
- as can be seen much more clearly in retrospect than at the time - left
African economies even more vulnerable than before to external economic shocks 
and in particular to declines or sustained stagnation in real earned import 
capacity and net real external resource transfers. Intensification of these
approaches - whether export led growth or standard import substitution - is
lj.xel/ in most cases to worsen the present situation and prospects rather than
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to improve them. Some of the strategic reformulations of 1979-84 might fare 
better if net external resource transfers were set to rise rather than to fall 
from $11,000 million to $5,000 million over the next decade, but - at least at 
present - seem to be almost as unsustainable as their predecessors.
Action is needed as soon as possible - the costs of delay are already high and 
rapidly esculating. In human terms people are starving and more are being 
ground into abject poverty, children are being deprived both of education and 
of the food and medical services needed to take advantage of it, societies and 
polities are being strained and eroded to the verge of breakdown and 
disintegration (or beyond). In productive capacity terms lack of inputs and 
of maintenance is not merely causing current output losses but rapidly 
undermining the directly productive, infrastuctural, service provision, 
institutional, managerial and policy making bases on which recovery must be 
built. In political and national terms continued unsuccess makes mobilisation 
of energy ever harder - confidence in ability to succeed is increasingly 
eroded by repeated failures, whatever their cause. That too is generally 
agreed at least in principle albeit both nationally and internationally there 
often appears to be an unhappy combination or alternation of frenetic, ill 
thought out attempted action which proves unsustainable together with 
interminable debate and negotiation over secondary issues of scope or detail 
or degree or phasing which waste time and increase the difficulty of action 
far more than they can improve its direction definition or targeting.
Defining Objectives: African and External
However, the urgent need for action and the backdrop to the prevailing 
economic malaise do not by themselves define what action. 1980-84 has been
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after all marked by a wide variety of policy, strategy, institutional reform 
and policy changes involving very real sacrifices and reallocations of 
resources. In the most severely affected states these have - at the best - 
bought time, slowed down political economic erosion or achieved a fragile and 
partial recovery to levels still far below those of a decade ago (Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe and Uganda to date being respective examples). Certain elements 
necessary for adequate action can be identified:
a. addressing the basic barriers to stabilisation, recovery and renewed 
development;
b. utilizing present potential to produce and present opportunities to
restore or expand both production and human welfare;
c. allocating or reallocating enough resources for priority targets to
be met;
d. realistic in its perception of the limits on what can be achieved
rapidly, but also on the limits in degree and time to which per 
capita stagnation or decline can be sustained without evolving into 
something much worse.
These criteria cannot be met within the present structures and dynamics of 
more than a handful of African economies (nor probably within the present 
political economic power structures, and dynamics of a number either). The 
need for structural change - at least economically - is no longer at issue 
even if its nature, diversity and phasing are.
Nor can in most cases can they be met without either increased or at the least 
radically altered flows of net foreign resource transfers.^ That proposition 
has been challenged from two directions: first that global recovery would
bring trade /olume and terms improvements adequate to allow stabilisation and
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recovery and second that a rapid delinking from imports could form the basis 
of a practicable 3hort term adjustment and recovery strategy. The first may 
well be true for a few economies but for many it would require positing 
50-100$ short term export volume increases and/or 25-50$ terms of trade 
recovery, neither of which is plausible. The second is simply implausible - 
the size, present structure, 1980-84 import compression and plausible 
structural change options of virtually all SSA economies mean that structural 
change (especially if directed toward national and regional economic 
integration) requires increased ability to import.
While the bulk of this sketch toward new political economic policies and 
stategies is directed to what needs to be done - and ultimately can only be 
done - by Africans in SSA, it remains true that rapid, adequate action does 
require more foreign exchange because import strangulation is a major cause of 
the present economic malaise and a major barrier to overcoming it. In the 
medium - and especially in the short - term that requires more net foreign 
resource transfers whether by expanded new grants, loans and investment, by 
rescheduling or writing off old loans, by reducing or subsidizing interest 
rates or a combination of these measures. However, simply increasing 
transfers - let alone commitments - is not enough. They must be relevant to 
the actual urgent needs of SSA economies. That requires more rehabilitation 
and deferred maintenance and gap filling finance and less large new projects 
which can neither be full operated nor properly maintained under existing 
import constraints and which in fact divert free foreign exchange from 
priority uses because the foreign finance does not cover their full direct 
plus indirect import requirements.
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Causes, Challenges and Responses
That the sudden worsening of SSA economic performance and prospects since 1979 
has been largely the result of external shocks and only secondarily of 
domestic policy or practice does not, in itself, define an appropriate course 
of action. Nor does the fact that the basic problem is falls in supply mean 
that cuts in and restructuring of demand can be avoided. One response is to 
hold on and seek to ride out by temporary cuts and increased use of bridging 
finance within the same strategy - an approach many SSA states applied 
reasonably successfully over 1973-75 and attempted, usually with disastrous 
results, from 1979 onward. It works if and only if restoration of the old 
context occurs. A second is to break the negative contextual forces - i.e.
restore stable 5—6% OECD growth, reverse terms of trade shifts, alter weather
patterns, halt South African aggression and destabilisation. A third is to 
ignore them and try to go on as before. Clearly none of these offers much 
hope for success.
The two approaches which seem - in conjunction - to be plausible in the
present SSA context are adjusting to changed contexts and restructuring to 
achieve the best possible results possible within them. However appropriate 
then the adjustment strategies of 1973-75 and the policy structures of 1976-79 
were at the time, they are unlikely to be fully appropriate to these 
approaches today.
The basic choices are of how to change. The simplest is seeking to strengthen 
existing institutions and polices with little change in the expectation that 
greater efficiency and moderate restraint will be enough. Botswana did
achieve this over 1981-83 but in the context of a stronger initial external 
balance position and lesser and more speedily reversed external shocks than
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are typical of SSA so that not many states can hope to follow that path. When 
pursued in the context of massive shocks, and a worsening context - as in 
Tanzania over 1979-80 - the results are likely to be such large cuts in 
resource allocations as to render all targets unattainable, to reduce, rather 
than increase, efficiency of institutions and of policies and to exacerbate 
output decline.
A second approach is to maintain basic strategic goals but to reformulate 
targets, priorities and sequences, e.g. to raise emphasis on export expansion 
to limit cuts in critical imports, to rephase broadening nominal access to 
pure water in order to maintain and rehabilitate existing systems, to cut 
investment in new projects to free import capacity to operate existing units, 
loosen recurrent budget balance criteria to avert the collapse of key 
productive sectors or basic services. In the absence of increased external 
resource inflows it is open to question how many SSA economies retain enough 
strength and balance to follow this course, optimal though it would appear to 
be.
A third approach is to alter the basic strategy - and to all intents and 
purposes its short and medium term political economic goals - and start 
afresh. This is likely to be practicable only in the context of near total 
economic collapse and/or of a new government - e.g. Uganda in 1981, Ghana in 
1 9 8 3 - and even then only if significant external resources are made available 
to cover the costs of reconstruction.
Diversities of Performance and of Goals
Despite a universal past and present of economio fragility and a dominant 
pattern of present and perspective per capita stagnation or decline, SSA is 
also marked by substantial past and present diversity. This is true among 
countries, e.g. Ghana has had a dismal economic record since 1960 while 
Malawi’s was - at least at macro level - satisfactory until the late 1970s. 
It is even truer by sector and sub-sector, e.g. Tanzania lacked an export 
development strategy at least until 1981 and was marked by export quantity 
declines from 1966 (with the exception on both counts of coffee, tea and 
tobacco) while the Ivory Coast’s export strategy and quantitative performance 
held up well until the end of the 1970s. The same applies to institutions: 
Tanzania’s Electricity Supply Corporation is basically highly efficient by 
most tests whereas its Marketing Devlopment Bureau (1976-81 agricultural 
policy and parastatal supervision unit) and - at least over 1977-1981 - its 
National Milling Corporation (grain procurement, storage, import/export and 
marketing) are case studies in cumulative institutional inefficiency and its 
macro economic consequences.
Further, because goals and strategies have varied, there is wide variation in 
what changes amount to restructuring, rescheduling and abandoning them. In 
Botswana as in Tanzania abandoning universal access to basic education, 
primary health care and pure water as medium term goals with targets for 
attaining them would be a major political shift (in the latter case one almost 
certainly not consistent with the political survival of the present system and 
most of its leaders) but in many SSA states these have - for various reasons - 
never been serious operational goals and their formal abandonment would 
scarcely affect political credibility. There are political constraints on 
possible changes in all SSA states but what these are depend on the socio
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economic structures, the makeup of the dominant sub-class coalition (and the 
probability of its changing), the perceptions (by workers, peasants, managers 
and proprietors as well as political leaders) of what is crucial in political 
economic terms and the economic records of the past two and a half decades. 
Any attempt to ignore these realities of diversity and prescribe a uniform 
agenda for action - as opposed to broadly applicable guidelines for framing 
African agendas - has little prospect either of technical economic efficiency 
or sustained economic viability.
Toward a Phased Return to Development
The course of emergency from economic malaise can be divided conceptually into 
four stages:
a) stabilisation - i.e. halting absolute and limiting per capita decline
to create a foundation from which to rebuild;
b) rehabilitation of eroded capacity in production, infrastructure,
basic services, institutional competence and policy 
making/implementation;
c) recovery (basically built on rehabilitation plus "debottlenecking"
investment, e.g. to increase earned import capacity or to substitute
for existing key imports) of output and consumption to aggregate
levels approximating those of 1979 (and to per capita ones
approximating 1979 for food and basic services) and sustaining growth 
of aggregate production and consumption^ at least equal to that of 
population (i.e. 3 to 4.5%);
d) renewed development including, but not limited to, patterns of
production growth consistent with sustaining internal and external
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balance as well as increasing average personal and communal
consumption while avoiding immiserisation of vulnerable groups of 
people.
A handful of SSA economies - notably that of Botswana - can start with the 
fourth stage. If they are able to act promptly on stabilisation a few more - 
for example Zimbabwe and the Ivory Coast - can largely avoid the need for 
massive rehabilitation because capacity is still endangered rather than
debilitated. For a majority all four stages are relevant. In practice the 
first three overlap sequentially - the political and human costs of 
stabilisation are likely to prove unsustainable without some parallel recovery 
while rehabilitation usually requires some parallel investment in structural 
change ("debottlenecking") which can be characterized as development before 
full recovery is achievable (or sustainable).
From Partial Agreement to Action
So far this review of SSA economic history, present realities, perspectives
and linked freedoms/necessities does cover ground on which there is fairly
12broad agreement. To that extent the recent World Bank review on SSA is
correct to speak of an "emerging consensus" and to argue that "delay in taking
action, whether by African governments or by donors, can no longer be
justified". However, the level of agreement is very general and - as the Bank
itself notes - does not extend to detailed articulation, sequences, priorities
13and rates of change. J In the actual formulation and implementation of action 
these can be very critical. As the Bank implies the cost of delay may be 
greater than the importance of some of the issues - a point perhaps 
particularly relevant to Structural Adjustment Programme negotiations and
often not adequately perceived by any of the parties to them. Nor is the 
agreement universal - within African states and externally there are 
dissenters whose objections and criticisms, often from radically divergent 
perspectives or interests, do combine to delay or thwart action.
There is increasing agreement that short term macro demand curtailment
programmes by themselves cannot provide a basis for recovery. At best they
can achieve ’stabilisation without adjustment” - that is allow some
restoration of internal and external balance so long as the economy is
operated at levels substantially below capacity and growth is negligible but
provide no ajdustment of basic supply or demand structures providing a
14foundation for renewed growth. Furthermore, the most prominent porgrammes 
of this kind - those of the IMF - are limited in duration of drawings and of 
repayment to dealing with a short term crisis (up to three years) while for 
most SSA economies a 5 to 7 year period of stabilisation, rehabilitation and 
recovery appears necessary.
To proceed further in outlining what is - or may need - to be done it is 
necessary to review some of the key sectors, instruments and contentions 
issues. Such a review can be no more than a sketch or check list for three 
reasons. The first is space. The second is the diversity of SSA. The third 
applied political economy is best articulated by those who must apply it, not 
externally whether by academicians or institutions. Both African governments 
and Africans and external institutions and academicians should reflect on the 
fact that over the 1970s agriculture was - in most countries - the sector 
receiving the greatest relative augmentation of attention and of resources and 
the sharpest policy and institutional changes and also the one in which 
foreign personnel, advice, models and in large scale projects frequently 
resources were most dominant at all levels from strategy through policy to
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project design implementation and - frequently - management.
Sectoral and Intrasectoral Priorities
Eight sectors - in a loose sense - which are of general priority are
export or import saving production, food, manufacturing, physical
infrastructure, human infrastructure, institutional infrastructure, policy 
infrastructure and knowledge infrastructure.
All SSA economies must give priority to raising earned import capacity, i.e. 
export expansion and to lowering demands on it, i.e. expansion of import
saving production. None has or in the near future will have a sustainable 
import to GDP ratio much below one quarter and none has an export sector with 
a safe medium to long term 6 to 8Í annual growth dynamic. Export promotion 
and import substitution need to be seen as two aspects of the same strategy of 
achieving external balance and sustainable development not as alternatives or 
opposites. There can be, and has been, e.g. extremely cost/benefit inefficent
export promotion just as there can be and has been equally inefficient import
substitution. In respect to neither are simple general answers (except wrong 
ones) available and for both selective rather than sector wide policy
intervention is likely to be critical in SSA as - in very different contexts
it has been for Brazil and South Korea, Hungary and Taiwan.
Historic primary product and semi-processed exports are, perforce, critical. 
For most two dilemmas need to be recognised. If most producers raise output 
rapidly the overall impact on price will be such as to cause each to earn less 
foreign exchange. And because world relative prices have been falling, with 
poor prospects for reversal in more than a handful of cases, to raise domestic
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real prices is to contradict both the basic principles of market economics and 
to plan to back losers. On the other hand to delink from these exports before 
alternatives have been established to replace them is to link firmly to even 
tighter dependence on grants, loans and external policy direction, as well as 
to import cuts to a degree inconsistent with attaining stabilisation much less 
development.
In the short term most SSA economies must identify the least unpromising 
options to raise exports including: restoring debilitated traditional exports 
(e.g. cocoa in Ghana, cashew in Tanzania, copper in Zambia), holding market 
share in all but the most unpromising existing exports (e.g. Zimbabwe should 
seek to do so in steel and ferrochrome), capitalising on new natural resource 
based export potential (e.g. natural gas and products in Nigeria and 
Cameroon, pulp and paper in Tanzania, reassessed gold deposits in Zimbabwe, 
coal in Botswana and Mazambique), developing new agricultural exports with 
reasonable market prospects (e.g soy beans, maize in several countries). Over 
the slightly longer term analysis of potential for pre-export processing and 
manufacture (e.g. of hides and skins, cotton, sisal, logs and timber, ores and 
concentrates) of present exports and intra-regional trade in manufactures (as 
well as energy and food) should in most cases identify potential for export 
expansion and diversification. What is uniformly needed is more coherent and 
imaginative analysis backed by more sustained and prioretized export promotion 
funding (in whatever form is most appropriate).
However, export promotion will not be enough to regain external balance - or 
to sustain it with to 6% GDP growth rates - for a majority of SSA economies 
- including in all probability some past star export performers like the Ivory 
Coast and Malawi. Equally systematic analysis of import substitution 
potential and priorities is needed in basic foodstuffs (including oilseeds,
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meat, fish, dairy products and perhaps sugar just as much as grain), in
commercial fuel and energy, in broad market consumer goods and intermediate 
inputs into them, in construction materials, in engineering (usually starting 
with plant plus spares and components) and in tradeable services (e.g. 
construction). Evidently not all theoretical possibilities will prove 
practicable or cost effective, but at the margin a number are almost certain 
to be more so than the foreign exchange earning alternatives actually open 
even in short (let alone long or medium) term perspective. Forex earning and 
forex saving need to be analysed, programmed and promoted more coherently than 
has usually been the case in SSA and as mutually complementary (indeed for 
some products necessarily joint uses) rather than as mutually contradictory.
Food availability per capita in most SSA economies for most Africans was
probably below nutritionally desirable levels in 1970 and has declined since. 
Even abstracting from droughts and allowing for the abysmal quality of most 
basic data (and the resulting error margins of all analysis based on it) there 
is a growing problem of not growing enough food.
Whether this is primarily a price problem is unclear because the prices 
growers receive for most of their food sales are not well known. Consumer 
food prices have risen more rapidly than other prices in most African 
countries for over two decades and official grower prices for food have in 
almost all cases outpaced wages - and in many cost of living - since the late 
1970s. This is not to say that too low official prices may not deter output 
of specific crops nor to deny the need for more rational and coherent setting 
of prices with greater regard for grower net incomes, changes in wages and 
other prices and ’free' market price indicators. These points are now
conventional wisdom - and partly (sometimes over—energetically) acted on in 
most of SSA. The ease and generality with which they can be argued, the
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simplicity of price alteration (or abandoning set prices) and the ease of 
monitoring price change conditions now create a danger that other frequently 
necessary conditions for price (or any other) policy changes to affect food 
output will not receive priority attention:
a. buyers (public or private) who are (or come) to accessible points at 
known times and pay in cash promptly are critical (and frequently 
absent);
b. transport to allow timely procurement and movement of crops and
movement/supply of input and "incentive” goods is frequently weak or
15absent (in both public and private sectors) because of 
infrastructure and vehicle park deterioration;
c. inadequate and overcentralized storage facilities frequently lead to 
peaking of seasonal transport demand, maximisation of transport 
costs, high storage losses and inability to hold intra-year reserves 
from good crops especially when there are several good and several 
bad years in a row;
d. basic services (health, education, accessible pure water, fuel) are 
frequently debilitated or never existed with direct negative 
production effects (time on wooding and watering, illness, tiredness, 
lack of knowledge) and equally clear disincentive effects as to 
staying in rural areas at all;
e. absence, shortages and untimely arrival of both agricultural 
production inputs (including even hoes in much of East and Central 
Africa) and of '’incentive" (basic consumer manufactures and 
construction materials) goods have become endemic even in middle 
income countries like Nigeria. Lack of inputs lowers production 
potential and without desired goods to buy no price is "real" to the 
peasant producer;
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f. research is usually neither locally field tested, user net income
viability tested nor peasant compatability tested so that, even if 
extended (which it often is not), it is likely to have a low
acceptance rate and a lower positive output result. For many food
crops in many areas applied research known to be relevant does not
exist.
It is as critical to devise food production strategies to identify and to 
overcome these defects as to "get prices right" - indeed in a number of cases 
it is probably more so. Prices can certainly cause shifts between or among 
crops - cross elasticities for substantial relative price movements are 
usually quite high. But - unless paralleled by measures to allow enhanced 
prooductivity - they have much less impact on overall output; most real price 
elasticities of overall agricultural output appear to be in the 0.3 to 0.5 
range historically and with decreased availability of inputs may be lower now. 
Certainly the gravest problem confronting SSA agriculture - and most peasant 
households within it - how to raise productivity per producer by means that
are both practicable for and economically rewarding to producers can only
marginally be tackled by price changes.
By and large all these points relate to marketed food, i.e. to producers with
surpluses above household provisioning requirements. But a significant 
proportion of the African food shortage rests on peasant households who are 
basically food producers but cannot grow enough to provision themselves 
adequately. For them higher food prices are irrelevant (or harmful) and cash 
input intensive packages for increasing food grown to be eaten by its growers 
usually financially inaccessible. Far more focussed and higher priority 
attention on how to respond to needs and problems of this group of hungry 
people who are also food producers is urgently needed in a significant number
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*  16 of SSA countries.
Manufacturing in Africa cannot solve certain problems (e.g. employment) and is
often inefficient by most tests. Unfortunately this has tended to cause a
17lack of attention both to its strengths and to its critical role in
stabilisation through renewed development, especially in respect to
agriculture and government revenue. In a significant number of SSA economies
adequate quantities of many basic agricultural inputs and most incentive goods
cannot be manufactured because forex for spares, direct inputs and fuel is
1 8restricted so that output is - say - 25% to 40Í of capacity and is snapped 
up in urban areas because of lower time, transport cost and risk factors even 
though rural prices are higher.
Similarly in several states much of the recurrent budget deficit results from 
loss of sales, import and company tax receipts directly caused, a fall in 
domestic manufactured goods output (e.g. virtually all of it in Tanzania where 
manufacturing output has fallen 50Í since 1979). It is very difficult in 
these cases to see how stabilisation of the government budget can be achieved
in the absence of rehabilitation and recovery in manufacturing.
Further cuts in real spending on maintenance and on basic services would be 
counterproductive. Savings from cutting wasted expenditure and reorganising 
programmes to achieve targeted outputs at lower cost are certainly possible 
but the most optimistic reasonable estimates of their short term yields are 
usually below required increases in maintenance expenditure. Military and 
pure administration spending is often in principle subject to reduction - how
far this is true in practice may be another matter.
Tax axfcernatives to restored import/sales tax revenue tend to have clear
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disadvantages. Higher or restored export and - in at least many cases - 
higher income and company taxes would have serious negative production 
incentive effects. Poll (head) taxes and high user charges for basic services 
are regressive, weigh particularly heavily on vulnerable groups and are often 
very cost inefficient in terms of personnel and funds required relative to 
revenue raised.
In the medium term manufacturing - as noted - is critical to the external 
balance position and to development of regional integration. The issues of 
cost are real but often are overgeneralised from the worst projects. While 
protection and state intervention over several decades are certainly not 
sufficient conditions for building a viable home based industrial sector and 
breaking through into exports, the cases of Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan - 
as well as tentatively Zimbabwe in SSA - suggest they are frequently necessary 
ones.
Physical infrastructure - transport (including rolling stock and vehicle 
parks), enterprise water supplies, communications, energy and storage - are 
among the most debilitated sectors in many SSA economies. In addition in a 
number of cases bottlenecks and overloads can be identified. These raise the 
cost of production and slow its pace as well as (or even more than) causing 
absolute direct output losses.1^  Rehabilitation, gap filling and 
debottlenecking and forward planning to avoid repetition of 
maintenance/overload/bottleneck problems are critical. The key missing 
element in almost all cases is forex - in certain cases because external funds 
are made available for new projects but not for rehabilitation or maintenance 
units; a problem sometimes exacerbated by a domestic preference for new 
projects.
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Human infrastructure sub-sectors - education, drinking water, health, domestic 
fuel, housing - are in many cases equally or more debilitated, especially in 
rural areas. Their importance in making possible present production - through 
reducing time demands of wooding and watering, saving human energy, increasing 
health and providing knowledge - are frequently seriously underestimated as is 
the disincentive impact of their absence or deterioration (in particular on 
rural-urban migration). Their relevance to future productive capacity (at 
least for education) and for the quality of life are more widely perceived 
although their special relevance to vulnerable groups (including women and 
children and particularly those of poor households) is probably 
underestimated. In these sectors three priority needs can be identified:
a. restoring effective coverage and quality (e.g. provision of paper, 
books, drugs, fuel, pump spares, staff retraining) of what has been 
created;
b. redesigning systems away from overconcentration on limited access, 
high quality - usually urban and upper income group oriented - 
sub-sectors toward more basic coverage;
c. filling gaps - particularly in specialised, middle level personpower 
(e.g. artisans, surveyors, technicians, bookkeepers) training - 
seriously hindering production and management and, as soon as 
resources permit, restoring advances toward universal access to basic 
services.
Institutional infrastructure can be defined as the presence (or absence) of 
knowledge, expertise, historic memory (e.g. useable filing and archive systems 
which are used), communications systems, accounting, coordination, monitoring 
and accountability within institutions, institutional sub-systems and overall. 
This ’sector" appears to have deteriorated radically in many SSA states over
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the past few years (partially because workers at all levels have responded to 
- negative - real wage and salary incentives). Unless it is rehabilitated 
management and policy capacity improvement will be virtually impossible to 
achieve. The specific weaknesses and priorities vary among and within 
countries (management and financial analysis accounting is virtually 
universally weak or absent and ex post accountability accounting often little 
better) and are usually so varied and numerous that careful priority setting 
and sequencing must go into national rehabilitation and development designing 
for different problems and institutions. Technical assistance (even by 
international management consultants) can be useful within a national 
commitment and programme but cannot substitute for them, while much of what is 
usually called institutional reform constitutes evading facing the weaknesses 
noted by drawing new organisational structures on paper built in reality on 
the old gaps and failings.
Data and research infrastructure is another sector which has historically been
weak and which has - despite increased resource allocations both financial and 
19personnel J - deteriorated in a majority of SSA economies. Again national and 
institutional diversities are substantial but three general points can be 
made:
a. greater prioretisation in terms of critical user needs (e.g. 
agricultural yield statistics and field - producer viability - 
peasant useability tested crop research) and better two way 
communication with users;
b. attention to having reasonably accurate data available in time to 
inform decisions (too often erroneous and correct but too late are 
both frequent defects);
c. more national and regional cooperation ranging from exchange of
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information up to joint training and programmes.
Instruments - Selected Priority Areas
In the area of instruments for implementing policies, projects and strategies 
nine stand out as deserving priority attention in most - or all - SSA 
countries: distribution, participation, incentives, micro management,
macro-management, public sector effectiveness, private sector, regional 
coordination/co-operation and external resources. Four further critical 
instruments - prices, overall economic management, employment and 
savings/investment increases are reviewed in the next section because they are 
areas of substantial disagreement (as well as agreement). Distribution and 
participation are - or can be - seen and analysed or prioretized as ends but 
are here considered as means or instruments.
Distribution and production are largely co-determined, i.e. who is able to 
take part in what way in production largely determines distribution. 
Redistribution after that is secondary. Therefore production support and 
incentives will largely determine income distribution - a fact not always 
adequately considered in selection of policies in these areas.
Redistribution can be seen as primary: altering ability to produce and rewards 
for producing; secondary: provison of basic services (which overlaps as these 
do raise present and future ability to produce); and tertiary: direct transfer 
payments (very limited in SSA relative to other regions and, unfortunately, 
dominantly to middle and upper income groups) and taxation. Any production 
policy or project - if successful - effects primary redistribution (whether 
provision of infrastructure, higher wages, grower prices, selection of a
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labour intensive project or one in a particular area). The need is to view 
this impact on a case by case and overall basis to ensure that the 
redistribution effects of production oriented decisions are overall (not 
necessarily for each project or policy) consistent with rather than inimical 
to national distribution targets. That is particularly critical in SSA 
because resources for significant transfer payments are not and will not in 
the forseeable future be available.
Participation is more widely lauded verbally than pursued fully and 
systematically in practice. Its first aspect of participation in production 
and second of participation in carrying out policies (e.g. community 
afforestation, self help inputs into infrastructure) are genuinely sought 
albeit rarely with enough attention to what peasants and workers say would 
motivate them to participate. Participation in taking decisions and designing 
policies/projects is honoured verbally but unevenly in practice, a failing 
frequently entailing high costs in technical design mistakes and wrong 
selection leading to poor participation in implementation and/or in 
operational performance. Participation in the sense of ability to hold 
officals and institutions - especially external agency personnel and projects 
- accountable is rarely even endorsed verbally and is usually resisted in 
pratice at least as energetically in SSA (and by external agencies and 
personnel there) as elsewhere. Setting its political implications aside, this 
absence of participation in holding to acount does damage to the other aspects 
of participation and helps perpetuate policy and incentive mistakes.
Incentives include prices (producer prices • including wages and their 
relationship to input and consumption good prices). Few in SSA wculd quarrel 
with that statement. However, there are other incentives.^  In the context 
of low and/or falling per capita output these require priority examination and
-26-
strengthening where possible precisely because so little can be done on the 
real price and real wage fronts. These include availability and quality of 
basic services and basic consumer goods (including construction materials) - 
areas in which it should be possible during rehabilitation and recovery to do 
rather more than will be possible on the real wage and producer price fronts. 
Community and national as well as ideological commitments and as a sense of 
meaningful participation and a belief that development (as defined by the
person) is attainable so that effort is not a pure waste are also critical 
motivating factors with which economists and economic decision takers find it 
hard to relate - often to the detriment of the effectiveness of strategy and
policy packages. That is particularly true when their initial impact is front
end loaded costs and their gains will take longer to be realised.
Micro-managerial capacity at institutional level (in both the public and
private sectors) level is an acknowledged pervasive weakness in SSA. Because 
the worsening national contexts have greatly increased demands on management 
it is hard to say whether in general - as opposed to identifiable specific 
cases - it is deteriorating absolutely. That it is increasingly often unable 
to combine day to day crisis management with normal ongoing activity 
supervision, annual operational planning and medium term forward planning is 
only too clear. Corrective measures are priorities. Some have alrady been 
mentioned, e.g. under institutional infrastructure. Others relate to training 
high and - especially - middle level personpower (not least bookkeepers, 
accountants and auditors). However, certain other contextual problems exist 
especially, but not only, with respect to government and public enterprise 
management. These include inadequate powers, enterprise targets and standards 
of performance and incentives, i.e. to the overall structure and context 
within which micro management takes place. Hardly unique to SSA, these 
problems are frequently more extreme and in the context of scarce and
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inexperienced managers often more costly in terms of performance.
Macro management includes sectoral and overall decision taking/policy making. 
Here the SSA record is very varied but skewed toward the bottom end of the 
scale. The most general problems relate to weaknesses in production, 
collection, analysis and use of data to inform decisions, design and implement 
policies and programmes, monitor results, achieve meaningful flexibility 
responding promptly to correctible deviations from intended performance or
other errors. Unfortunately these weaknesses are rarely seen as a cluster of 
related and endemic problems and still more rarely given priority attention. 
Failure of coordination and of testing for consistency (particularly by 
central economic units) is more frequently cited as a weakness but serious 
action (except by ad hoc expansion of Treasury powers which may or may not be 
effective) results rather less frequently.
Public sector effectiveness requires subdivision between government and public 
enterprise. In the first case there is frequently a need to prioretize to see 
that the most important functions (including these for which there are no
realistic private sector or community alternatives) are carried out adequately 
even if this means totally dropping some desirable but less critical services. 
A frequent problem following real budget cuts and forex constraints is an
imbalance toward personnel who for budgetary or foreign exchange scarcity 
reasons do not have the resources to carry out their duties. Either less
personnel or larger budgetary and forex allocations for complementary inputs 
are essential to restoring operational balance in such cases.
Recurrent budget deficits are now endemic in SSA - even in countries which 
achieved regular surpluses to the late 1970s - and do contribute substantially 
to inflationary pressures. Since real expenditure levels - excluding interest
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and production incentive subsidies (which may of course be inefficient and
targets for cuts) have fallen significantly in most cases while certain key
areas - maintenance and repair generally but also basic health and medical
services - urgently need restored real levels, the bulk of the balancing
should come from increased revenue. Contrary to popular impression SSA
21government recurrent budgets are not particularly large relative to GDP nor 
is the number of employees as a proportion of economically active population.
A case for reprioretisation (including reducing waste) certainly exists; one 
for general reductions is much less apparent.
Public enterprises also often suffer from overextension and would benefit from
prioretisation on a basis analogous to government. They also suffer from the
micro-managerial weaknesses noted above - as do governments. However, their
efficiency of performance - on almost any criteria - varies widely (wildly
indeed) among and within countries; almost no generalisations are valid in
that respect. Similarly the reasons for their creation or acquisition, the
roles they play and the presence or absence of real private sector
alternatives are anything but uniform. Given the wide range of results there
is a general case for review and for seeking to bring up the standards of the
weakest priority public enterprises toward those of the strongest as well as
22phasing out low priority, unprofitable ones.
Private sector utilisation probably deserves more attention in most SSA 
economies, albeit since all are in fact mixed economies and fairly certain to 
remain so this is far more a matter of degree and less one of ideology than is 
usually supposed. A practical problem is that neither advocates nor critics 
of public enterprise in Africa really have examined the capacity, viability 
and efficiency of the private sectors and sub-sectors (large-medium-small, 
domestic-foreign) in SSA. These vary widely and the advocates of unleashing
- 29 -«
the private sector seem at the general level to overestimate them absolutely 
as well as relative to the public sector enterprises which sometimes are as or 
more efficient in specific (not all) cases. Two further issues need
exploration in respect to more effective private sector utilisation. The 
first is whether at the large enterprise level it is generally possible. 
Domestic private capacity is limited. The current economic situation and 
prospects of SSA are not such as to attract foreign investors except for very 
special projects or in a handful of countries. Second, economic macro 
management and micro intervention to balance private sector incentives and 
broader national economic interest is - in general - not a strong point of 
African states; overregulation and unintended disincentives and 
underregulation (by market or other means) and unintended (at least by the 
state) bonanza donation are all too frequent - often in the same state.
Regional economic coordination is - for most SSA states - a means to 
broadening the range of viable production and exports, reducing establishment 
and operational costs for some institutions - programmes - infrastructure and 
for coordinating development and use of transport and communications 
facilities. To achieve these ends it needs to be based on perceived mutual 
interests which usually turn on production and transport with trade as a 
consequential validating means not an end in itself. This suggests need for 
rethinking approaches to coordination/cooperation - the orthodox trade 
preference centred model has a rather resounding history of failure or very 
limited success perhaps because it can work only within a broader and less 
rigid frame and certainly one in which "trade diversion", i.e. reducing extra 
regional import content by substituting imports from the cooperation group 
largely balanced by exports to it is seen as crucial not undesirable.
"Trade diversion" in fact is a misleading term in the context of substantial
I
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underutilisation of capacity because of foreign exchange constraints and of 
clear ceilings on medium term global market exports. Substitution of regional 
imports for those now imported from extra-regional sources (quite possible for 
a substantial number of products) will not in fact reduce the sustainable 
level of imports from outside the economic co-operation area but alter its 
composition. Imports are forex supply not product demand constrained. By the 
same token, imports from within the cooperation area are often as important as 
exports to it. Various forms of countertrade (including services as well as 
goods) will need to be developed on a larger scale if rapid coordination area
trade growth is to be sustained since rapid unbalanced trade expansion with
growing hard currency settlements by debtors is not feasible and with growing 
blocked balances/arrears is unattractive to creditors (regional net 
exporters).
External Resources: Quantity, Quality, Relevance
External resources are critical to achieving stabilisation, rehabilitation and
recovery. First, more resources are needed. Second, these should be far less
tied to projects and far more generally useable to support rehabilitation and
the operation of key existing capacity (e.g. health, industry). Third, for
most purposes in most SSA states - with a handful of possible middle income 
24group exceptions - grant or near grant money is needed. 9% loans drawn over
3 years and repaid over the next 5 are, in general, totally unsuitable as to
cost and duration (even if from the IMF). Fourth, SSA, as stressed by the
24Commonwealth's Lever Commission cannot possibly repay existing debt as 
scheduled and present levels of debt service plus any plausible commercial 
arrears reduction programme are quite unamangeable for over half SSA states, 
--oncerted attention to long term debt reconstruction and consolidation as well
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as accompanying new money and radical SSA improvement of debt recording and
management are priorities for most countries.
External finance is critical to African action being effective. It - unlike
African action - requires external iniatives and programme articulation.
Seven urgent things to be done can be identified:
a. avert the impending decline from $11,000 million to $5,000 million in 
net resource transfers to SSA;
b. increase annual public sector - national and multinational - net 
transfers by $3,000 to $4,000 specifically oriented to structural 
adjustment toward stabilisation, rehabilitation and recovery 
largely on grant or very soft loan terms;
c. expand, redesign and extend the drawing and repayment periods of IMF 
programmes to make them compatible with adjustment toward recovery 
and with immediate stabilisation and partial recovery of output in 
key sectors;
d. provide interest subsidies - e.g. on export credits and IMF drawings 
- to poor economies;
e. develop access to intermediate cost credit - e.g. 4 to 6%, 5 years 
grace plus 10 to 15 years repayment - for lower middle income SSA 
states such as Kenya,.Swaziland and Zimbabwe which are today both 
ineligible for substantial soft finance and unable to afford adequate 
capital inflows on commercial (or even IMF - World Bank - export 
credit) terms;
f. reschedule SSA external debts within the broad parameters of 5-6 
years grace and 10 to 15 years to repay for both principle and
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arrears and - on a case by case basis - either lower interest rates 
or writeoff debt to create manageable short and medium term interest 
payment and principal repayment profiles;
g. develop instruments for consolidating and rescheduling commercial
arrears at bearable interest costs over manageable repayment periods 
for the 15 to 20 SSA economies for which these are a serious barrier 
to regaining external balance and normal methods of paying for (or 
normal prices paid for imports) with special priority to cases such 
as Zambia and Tanzania in which such arrears approximate or exceed a 
full year's export earnings.
At the same time it must be recognised that not all external resource
transfers to SSA have been beneficial and that the proportion which are or
will not be has been increased by growing foreign exchange shortages and
economic stagnation or decline. In this respect three negative imperatives 
stand out:
a. cease promoting projects of doubtful (or patently negative) economic 
value to SSA economies even if they would be beneficial to lender 
exports, (e.g. a significant proportion of international airport 
projects);
b. do not design or approve projects with untested, speculative or 
clearly inadequate direct and indirect productive potential - a 
criticism relevant to a large number of 1970's integrated rural 
development projects;
c. do not stick rigidly to the dominance of project finance in grants 
and lending even when the recipiant's economic situation and 
prospects indicate that there is little chance of adequate 
maintenance or reasonable capacity utilisation ratios except by
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cutting back on the maintenance and utilisation of existing 
productive, infrastructural and service capacity.
Foreign resource transfers should relate to SSA national stabilisation - 
rehabilitation - recovery - renewed development strategies. The basic 
responsibility for designing, implementing and monitoring such strategies
rests on the states concerned, as does the coordination of particular public 
and private sources of finance. However, it is both realistic and reasonable 
to expect that would be sources of external financial support will insist on 
particpating in, setting conditions on and monitoring strategy, policy and
programme design, articulation and implementation. If they do so individually 
in isolation their varying terms and conditions will be an even greater 
barrier to making any strategy operational without serious loss of time and 
misallocation of scarce SSA personnel and managerial resources than they
already are. If they are coordinated by donor organised groups they are 
likely to be - and to be perceived by SSA states as being - inconsistant with 
genuinely SSA initiatives and to repent or aggravate past experience of 
overinvolvement of resource providers in project design with serious costs in 
terms of data, context and operationality errors as well as of genuine African 
commitment to the project or programme. The road forward would appear to lie
with SSA state organised consultative or coordinating groups, joint 
coordinating groups in each key sector and joint monitoring of the performance 
of both the resource providing and the recipient states and institutions.
To be useful external resources need to be useable in support of agreed 
strategies. In the present context of all but a few SSA states this implies:
a. additional ’balance of payments support” finance dircted toward 
increased levels of capacity utilisation in critical sectors (e.g.
agriculture, industry, health, education) including current 
production inputs;
a parallel increase in priority to rehabilitation programmes (with 
particular reference to infrastructure but also to agriculture and 
industry);
selective support for new capacity prioretised in terms of breaking 
existing or avoiding medium term bottlenecks (e.g. in electricity and 
in commercial water supply);
finance in support of- export (including regional and sub-regional 
export) expansion including revolving funds to enable enterprises to 
purchase imported inputs and to extend export credit; 
financial cooperation with SSA economic coordination initiatives and 
their priority programmes including general eligibility of 
coordination group members (and other SSA economies) to bid for 
contracts financed by grant or concessional loan funds; 
funding of programmes designed to limit losses from economic malaise 
and from production oriented adjustment strategies to vulnerable 
groups (e.g. the UNICEF/Danida rural basic drug project in Tanzania); 
give enhanced priority to coordinated international - regional - 
national programmes of applied research (especially in agriculture, 
forestry and health) of direct relevance to SSA economies; 
be willing to provide the full direct and indirect foreign exchange 
cost of projects and programmes (either singly or in collaboration 
with other external sources) and to fund at least a substantial 
portion of unanticipated cost overruns to avoid unsustainable drains 
and diversions of recipient states limited free foreign exchange 
resources and to avoid delays and cancellation or prolonged 
renegotiation of projects because the SSA side is in fact unable to 
put up the indirect import cost component.
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i. in programmes not containing large balance of payments support and 
rehabilitation components which will directly or indirctly reduce the 
recipient government’s domestic financing requirement (and in 
countries with excessive domestic financing requirements resulting 
from objectively insufficient revenue bases despite fiscal effort and 
prudence in spending) include a portion of government local cost 
finance in the external grant and soft loan support.
Areas Of Controversy And/Or Confusion
Seven areas appear to generate substantial controversy - part real, part
arising out of diverse concerete case and part out of confusion of terms.
These are efficiency, prices, protecting vulnerable groups of people,
population growth, raising savings and investment rates, employment and supply 
and/or versus demand management.
The problem surrounding efficiency is that it requires specific qualification 
as to efficiency for what purposes and to whose benefit. It is not logically 
possible to say whether an allocation, policy or enterprise is efficient until 
its goals and intended beneficiaries are specified. (Inefficiency in the 
extreme is easier to define - allocations, policies and enterprises 
inefficient on almost any test abound, and not only in SSA.) Import
non-intensity, export intensity, total scarce resource cost, profitability, 
contribution to real GDP etc are all valid criteria of efficiency in a number 
of contexts - unfortunately they do not necessarily give the same answers or 
rankings. Further present and future efficiency often diverge so that time 
discount - and avoiding dead end - issues arise. So too do preferences - 
Uganda's macro-magendo (monopolistic parallel economy) system in its heyday
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was in some ways a very efficient one and one which arguably had more 
potential for achieving accumulation, structured change and economic 
reconstruction than its successor, but it was such a humanly appalling system 
that not even fervent free market advocates chose even to consider backing 
it. Most cases are not that extreme, but political economic preferences are 
real and overriding them also has costs.
Prices (including exchange rates) are not an area of total disagreement. They 
are critical in respect to incentives and to overall and micro-economic 
management. As such they need to be made/allowed to be consistent and to be 
managed to facilitate regaining viable external and domestic balance 
positions. Up to that point there is general agreement - and that agreement 
suggests the need for substantial price - including exchange rate - changes in 
many SSA economies. The real issues seem to be:
a. how much price management is needed and for what purposes - i.e. how
imperfect are SSA markets under present conditions of extreme
scarcity?
b. how generally appropriate is the price mechanism for basic services 
(e.g. health) and for other goods whose broad use has external
economies to communities and/or countries?
c. how far can economic management via prices go and in what cases 
should what other economically based allocation devices be used, e.g. 
bank credit? foreign exchange? certain basic consumer goods (in 
general and/or to rural areas in particular)?
d. how generally can tax/subsidy price incentives be used - e.g. is the 
proposal to use packages to deter and reverse deforestation and bush 
cutting, soil erosion and similar economic degradation by poor
peasants a practicable (or an efficient) one?
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e. how fast can major adjustments be made without fracturing already
weak structures or setting off inflationary forces which rapidly
cancel attempted 'once for all', 'shock treatment' changes (e.g. in
27exchange rates)?
f. when do the benefits of certain types of price manipulation, e.g.
efficient production cost plus based price controls, uniform farmgate 
prices, pre-set seasonal or multiyear prices for crops outweigh the 
costs?
These are all legitimate questions which are in danger of being obscured or 
answered at a sweepingly general level when in fact the answers vary 
significantly from country to country, price to price and time to time. 
Workable answers can only be formulated in specific contexts by those who will 
have to work them and live with the consequences. Further they will need 
regular review and - like prices themselves - to be changed from time to time.
A related set of arguments turning on prices are really about income 
distribution and - unfortunately usually tend to be conducted on both sides 
with little effort to estimate what the actual impact would be. For example 
in Tanzania proposals to close the recurrent budget deficit, increase overall 
enterprise profits and raise real grower prices 25-50% at one go would require 
lowering real wages, salaries and informal sector incomes at least 5055 
(following a 50% average 1 9 7 9 - 8 3 fall). This is politically impracticable 
and, given that the minimum wage's purchasing power is about 25% below the 
average peasant household cash and self provisioning (food housing) real 
income while wage earner average productivity is substantially higher, would 
seem to pose economic efficiency and equity problems as well as presupposing 
that wage earners do not respond to economic incentives and disincentives (to 
disincentives by moonlighting, theft, corruption and a number of other
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practices whose personal economic efficiency is high but whose systemic cost 
is probably even higher). Within a context of stagnant or falling national 
purchasing power (physical GDP adjusted for terms of trade changes) there are 
in the short run few or no degrees of freedom for raising any broad group of 
real incomes significantly - by relative price changes or any other route - 
unless an almost immediate net gain in production equivalent to the real 
income increase can be anticipated with reasonable certainty, or unless soft
external finance to cover the costs to other groups is available.
Protecting vulnerable groups is partly a matter of economic prudence because 
2 8in SSA children and women are among the most vulnerable and the medium term
economic cost of not protecting them is high. However, for other vulnerable
groups - especially farmers and pastoralists pushed into sub-marginal, high
risk .areas and much of the urban informal sector - the political economic case
is more humane or social and/or political than production economics based. As
the Lever Report commented ’erosion in living standards has pushed their
20peoples to the margin of tolerance’ - a point truest for vulnerable groups.
One protection - and one which has been fully maintained in few if any SSA 
economies - is continued access to basic services and a second - which has 
been eroding - is drought or famine relief (including food-for-work rural 
construction schemes as in Zimbabwe). The basic answer however must include 
making it possible for members of these groups to raise productivity and
reduce risk. This requires research on what is practicable in any actual
context and a recognition that in cost/production benefit terms the payoff 
will be low and that the additional output (or its proceeds if sold) will be 
virtually 100$ consumed by the producing households. In urban cases removal 
of petty regulations - e.g. licensing, banning various types of vendors and
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other service sellers - and fees - e.g. on standpipe water and on petty
trading - can be valuable out of all proportion to any revenue or other
. 30loss.
Subsidies and transfer payments cannot be a general answer - they cannot be 
financed. Some selective ones may be practicable, e.g. noon or morning school 
meals, semi-subsidised employment for crippled or blind persons with no 
relatives to support them but not much more. This is an area in which the 
private and voluntary sectors - as well as the more traditional extended 
family and kinship groups - should be mobilised to help.
There is a growing awareness that production oriented strategies and heavy
31reliance on market pricing do threaten vulnerable groups. The debate is on 
what groups are seriously at risk, how they can be shielded and what 
approaches are cost efficient.
Rapid population growth requires resources before it raises output and in the 
context of limited fertile land with dependable rainfall and low increases in 
output per hectare exacerbates the food availability crisis. Quick 
successions of pregnancies are damaging to child and mother health and to 
family ability to feed, clothe, educate the children. That much is broadly 
(or at least increasingly) agreed whatever the debates about optimum 
population size. Crude pro-natalism is on the whole in retreat.
However, what instruments are effective in reducing birth rates is less agreed 
with a tendency for proponents of one instrument to ignore others. Education 
- for mothers and for children - is associated with smaller (and better 
spaced) families as is lower infant mortality. Historically falls in birth 
rates have been associated with increases in old age security (not necessarily
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by state schemes) and increases in real incomes (including of poor 
households). These conditions will prove hard to meet in SSA. In their 
absence more demographic research and state pronouncements (except perhaps on 
child spacing) will have relatively little impact and access to family 
planning knowledge and hardware (desirable though it is and together with the 
other elements effective) a real but usually quite limited one. In particular 
to view lower population growth as an attainable short term alternative to 
higher growth of food production is grossly unrealistic.
Raising domestic savings ratios in SSA today may not be a generally plausible 
or desirable objective until exports rise substantially relative to GDP or 
external resource flows increase significantly. In the context of severe 
foreign exchange constraints in which earned import capacity can at most cover 
critical operating imports plus external interest payments, domestic savings 
ex post cannot by definition exceed the true local content of GFCF allowing 
for indirect as well as direct imports, i.e. it is limited to 35 to 50% of it. 
An attempt to raise them ex ante is likely to fail and to reduce use of 
productive capacity or to build up ’investment1 in stocks of goods which can 
in practice neither be exported nor used directly in GFCF. If it succeeds, a 
shift from consumption to saving will, because of the above average import 
content of GFCF, only be made possible within constant forex use by a 
consumption cut two or three times as large,. Certainly capacity growth will 
be enhanced but at the cost of falling capacity utilisation and lower total 
present output.
Under conditions of falling real per capita income and substantial excess 
capacity, stabilisation and recovery are likely to be pursued more effectively 
by seeking first to restore output growth to levels at least equal to that of 
population and only then seeking to rebuild overall capacity growth rates o^
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similar levels. If overall capacity underutilisation is 15-20Í (for Zimbabwe 
in 1984 it is likely to be 15—20%) then 4 to 5Í growth of output and 3% growth 
of capacity would still leave capacity utilisation at or under 90% in 1990. 
Over that initial period GFCF should be concentrated on bottleneck breaking 
and laying foundations for regaining external balance not on attempting to 
force up capacity growth rates in general.
These constraints do not bind so tightly once significant export growth is 
achieved or if additional foreign resource flows allow substantial 
rehabilitation and recovery. Nor do they mean that recurrent government and 
public enterprise budget balance should not be sought, but that the reasons 
for so doing in much of SSA at present relate to micro and macro management 
rather more than to increasing total savings.
Employment - in the sense of productive wage or self employment - is critical 
to SSA economy extrication from economic malaise at the macro and even more at 
the household level. Since SSA has relatively plentiful unskilled labour its 
more productive use is logically central to any production enhancing/scarce 
resource economising strategy. Equally production which excludes much of the 
labour force will exclude many households from distribution. Both points lie
behind the switch of emphasis from large farms - which are for most crops and
32under most conditions in SSA both cost and foreign exchange inefficient when 
compared to many peasant producers and also do not touch the problems of low 
income rural households except to render them still less soluble by diverting 
both resources and markets - toward peasant producers. They apply more 
generally if serious attention is paid to how labour intensity can be 
augmented and unskilled (or newly semi-skilled) labour productivity enhanced - 
a task which has rarely been seen as a policy priority although it would seem 
to be so both from the production and distribution/participation viewpoints.
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What attention there has been has usually overconcentrated on manufacturing - 
not in fact the largest nor the most hopeful sector in terms of technology 
shifts to expand employment consistent with constant costs - and paid too 
little attention to construction, maintenance and repair and other services.
In a different sense employment in the public (and large scale private) sector 
is a problem because reduced output (usually for forex but sometimes for 
market constraint reasons) has reduced productivity and created an imbalance 
in outlay while falling real wages have eroded incentives and thus yet further 
lowered productivity. Unless output - whether in health, education or a 
directly productive enterprise - can be restored, a real case exists for 
reducing the numbers employed and using a substantial part of the savings to
"3 "3increase the real wages of those still employed. J For example the lack of 
inputs, vehicles and fuel, knowledge to external and training means that at 
least half of Tanzania's 50,000 odd agricultural extension workers have 
negligible productivity. As many are in effect peasants of slightly less than 
average efficiency (from being out of practice) a case can be made for a 50Í 
retrenchment combined with a 25% wage increase and more complementary inputs 
for those still employed. The problem with this approach - apart from the 
serious one of opposition by a well organised group of losers - is that it may 
create a new vulnerable group requiring support to reestablish itself.
Demand vs supply management disagreement tends to set discussants at cross 
purposes because of the varying meaning of the terms. Demand management - 
whether Keynesian or IMFist - tends to concentrate on macro monetary 
aggregates. In the context of SSA it is concentrated on reducing resource use 
to correspond to supply. Macro aggregates are important - but far from 
everything. Achieving balance is a priority for attaining stabilisation but 
since the present crises are dominantly supply collapse initiated and manifest
- 43 -
themselves in capacity under-utilisation and specific resource imbalances not 
generalised overheating a strong case exists against unselective macro demand 
cutting as the prime route to stabilisation.
Supply management has two very different strands - macro ideological (as in
Laffer Curves) and micro contextual (as in World Bank structural adjustment
programming). The relevance of the former to SSA is arguably very limited.
The latter is critical. Restoring supply and altering its structure to remove 
specific imbalances (e.g. in food, energy and farex) is the basis of restoring 
balance to provide a basis for recovery and sustained growth through pushing 
available resources (supply) back up to previous levels of resource use
(demand). Whether SAP's as now designed are optimal is an important but
secondary issue - they are serious attempts to achieve adjustment by 
increasing production not cutting demand (and under SSA conditions further 
reducing production). While they should be a complement to and further stage 
of IMF adjustment programmes designed to stabilise, in fact, they are 
increasingly incompatible with them because IMF style stabilisation - even in 
SSA - is based on a short term, macro monetary model which virtually requires 
that demand cuts (and perhaps increased GFCF) not capacity utilisation and 
rehabilitation receive pride of place. There is an urgent need to reconcile 
initial stabilisation with parallel rehabilitation and subsequent recovery - 
stabilisation without adjustment which can lead to recovery, let alone 
stabilisation which prevents such adjustment, is hardly worth having.
Applied Political Economy and Parameters: Degrees of Freedom and Necessity
Any exercise in structural adjustment that goes beyond the verbal stages is by
definition an exercise in applied political economy not pure economic theory
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or technical optimality. Whether this is a good thing (as the author on 
balance supposes) or a bad thing (as the World Bank frequently suggests) is 
somewhat beside the point: it is an objective reality just as much as the
levels of rainfall or the need to restore levels of critical imports.
That statement has definite implications. Applied political economy beyond
the most general principles exists and operates in specific contexts and
within specific constraints and parameters. It is never value free - even
though the values and decision taking coalitions who back and intend to
benefit from them vary from state to state, over time and usually to a degree
from sector to sector and institution to institution. To attempt to abstract
from these contexts, parameters and values (whether by ignoring them or by
seeing, condemning and prescribing in contradiction to them) is an exercise in
partial or total futility. When it ignores or repudiates basic goals and
values of the dominant decision taking coalition it is likely to be heard as a
call for political and class coalition structural change or even for
revolution. If that is what is intended the exercise has a point (especially
if it is by Africans who in some sense speak for significant numbers of their
fellows) but its point is radical political change not - until that political
change is achieved - that of applied political economy. Too many external
•54prescriptions either accidentally or willfully ignore this fact.
Contexts, parameters and goals/values do change and evolve. At any time there 
are likely to be degrees of freedom within them - often quite significant
ones. Over time changing them is a logical and fairly standard objective of 
applied political economy. But to utilise degrees of freedom or to alter 
constraints requires prior identification of what they are. The designers, 
articulators, validators and implementers of applied political economy can and 
do make economic history but they cannot do so in any way they may wish. To
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attempt that doubtless creates economic history but the economic history of 
ineffectuality, failure and/or unintended and undesired results. To take the 
political out of political economy is possible - as is the dehydration of
water - but for purposes of extricating SSA economies from their current 
economic malaise the one product seems to be as likely to be useful as the 
other.
Parameters - e.g. import to GDP, import to GFCF (gross fixed capital
formation), overall and sectoral production growth trends, output-employment 
ratios, debt service ratios, current external account trends and productions, 
factor share distribution ratios - are important to the applied economic 
strategy of stabilisation through renewed development in two very different
ways. In the short run they offer guides to what constraints are binding and 
what degrees of freedom exist. For example, if the direct import content of 
GFCF is 45í and that of other production (including the domestic component of 
GFCF) is 201o - roughly the position in Zimbabwe - then raising GFCF by any 
given amount within a constant total expenditure requires . 3 6 times that 
amount more imports (.45 plus .2 times .55 less .20) while to make the shift 
with constant foreign exchange availability will require a reduction of 
consumption by about three times and of total current output by about twice 
the increase in GDP.
This revealed constraint suggests exploration of degrees of freedom in types 
of investment (e.g. most buildings and works) and methods (e.g. labour
intensive construction) which are less import intensive and/or less capital 
intensive (e.g. shallow wells instead of boreholes) if they are technically 
feasible and relevant to the particular purposes for which the investment is 
needed. In the short run these may be fairly limited, in the medium they 
should not be negligible.
However, the second guide - for priorities over the medium and longer term - 
from identifying constraints - is to focus attention on how the constrictive 
parameters might be altered. In the case cited the broad implication is of a 
priority for increased volume and range of inputs into investment, ie 
construction materials, specialised contracting services, plant, transport 
equipment and machinery. In the specific case of Zimbabwe which has an 
integrated iron and steel industry and an engineering-transport 
equipment-spares and machinery sector but a relatively weak articulation 
between the two it strongly suggests investigating how steel industry 
rehabilitation and expansion could be structured to increase linkages with the 
metal using GFCF oriented sectors and thereby to increase the national 
integration and reduce the direct and indirect import content of investment.
It is important to know and to act on parameters in both these ways. To 
ignore their short term constraint implications (or the degrees of freedom 
within them) is usually a recipe for attempting - and failing - to reach the 
impossible by failing to recognise its impossibility (or by passive acceptance 
of the correctible as inevitable). However, to accept these constraints and 
limited degrees of freedom as permanently binding is to fail to recognise the 
possibility of creative structural adjustment and to fail to seek - or to 
achieve - what would have been possible by failing to identify the possibility 
and the route to achieving it. Freedom is, at least in this context, the 
right understanding of necessity - of identifying what is (and is not) 
possible, when and how.
- 47 -
Motes Toward the Beginnings of Revival
SSA’s economic malaise can be overcome. There is a growing body of 
identification of causes and of areas in which action is needed plus - less 
clearly - what action is both desirable and practicable not merely at 
sub-continental but, more important, at national, sectoral and local, levels. 
With a lag this knowledge is coming to inform the attitudes and priorities of 
a growing number of African decision takers, states and institutions and - 
more slowly - of external agencies and decision takers relating to SSA.
However, several elements toward the beginning of revivals are less evidently 
or at least less generally present:
a. A realisation of how serious the problems and prospects are, e.g. how 
much capacity has been eroded, how fast debt service is likely to cut 
net capital inflows, how little benefit SSA will - without 
significant structural change - gain from trickle out of plausibly 
projected OECD recovery;
b. a parallel realisation of how urgent it is to articulate and execute 
coherent strategy and policy changes both because failure tends to 
become self-perpetuating and because the time lag between execution 
and initial positive results is likely to be 12 to 24 months and to 
full recovery 5 to 10 years;
c. a partly consequential failure of Africans to inform and educate 
Africans as to the realities and the options open to them in order to 
mobilise support for renewed (and painful) effort based both on an 
appreciation of how dire realities, and how restricted options, are 
and oin a belief that something can be achieved;
d. adequate levels of external resource flows which are in fact usable
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to support strategies and agendas of the type discussed and which are 
made available fast enough to allow implementation to begin (and the 
strategy to be perfected during its operation) not delayed so long 
that the underlying situation has worsened so much as to require a 
basically new (and poorer) strategy/policy package;
e. enough African involvement in intellectual explanation and dialogue 
and especially in strategy - policy - praxis design and articulation, 
enough recognition among external actors that without such 
involvement the success of any strategy or agenda is improbable or of 
having and displaying enough respect for and interaction with African 
initiatives - even if they, like the external ones, are to date 
imperfect and incomplete.
The last point may require elaborating. Evaluations of aid efficiency at 
project level show that lack of substantive technical and decision taker
African involvement in design and execution regularly leads to avoidable
contextual and data input mistakes, to low operating efficiency, to 
non-accountability (or to external accountability incompatible with coherent 
national policy making and implementation) and to lack of national commitment
(’their' project not 'ours'). These costs are likely to be even more severe
at sectoral, macro-economic and macro-political economic levels. Strategies 
and their articulation can - to a point - be imposed on desperate countries 
but they are unlikely to avoid major technical flaws, to be implemented more 
than grudgingly and partially or to yield the intended results of their 
sponsors - as a number of institutions have presumably discovered in Zaire 
over the past decade.
Verbally this reality is widely accepted. In practice it is not. African 
designed stabilisation and recovery programmes have not to date received
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serious external consideration if they have been in the least unorthodox. 
Proposals for external cooperation coordination call for donor (not jointly) 
staffed and operated secretariats, lead donor (not national or ’neutral* 
agency) convened consultative meetings, lead donor (not joint) monitoring of 
performance of commitments and nature of results. Whether extra African 
individuals and agencies know more about SSA than Africans is open to doubt 
(in some cases and areas perhaps so); that only Africans and African bodies 
are primarily and permanently committed to achieving African development and 
that they will reap the main costs of failure is indisputable.
This is not to deny the importance of reinforcing African knowledge and 
institutional capacity through transfers of knowledge, technology and 
personnel embodying them to be selected and used by African governments, 
institutions and enterprises. More such transfers are needed albeit with 
better quality control, selectivity, realisation of divergences in national 
needs and absorptive capacity and humility as to capacities and limitations. 
But far more than now they should be chosen by Africans, work within African 
institutional contexts, be meaningfully responsible and accountable to 
Africans and have limited (whether line or staff) autonomous powers. ’Have a 
headache? Take two expatriates.’ has worked well as a technico-managerial
capacity prescription for a few SSA states but it is neither generally
practicable nor desirable even in the short run and is inherently dangerously 
addictive. As with other crucial sectors, expatriate personnel are priorities 
for import substitution - and as in respect to most sectors that import 
substitution is never likely to, and rarely should, reach 100%.
These elements - recognition of seriousness and urgency, mobilisation, 
external resource flows, African involvement and leadership together with
external acceptance of and respect for it - are in themselves urgent and
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serious. They are elements toward whose construction academics and 
intellectual technicians can, at the highest estimate, play only a supporting 
role. And only in respect to external resources and external acceptance of 
African leadership in respect to SSA recovery can the dominant motive force be 
external. Even in those areas external response might well be more positive 
if SSA governments, decision takers and intellectuals were more and more 
creatively assertive.
External finance is not a sufficient condition for turning SSA economies 
around. But for most it is a necessary condition for doing so in the 
forseeable future. First, the impending decline in net real external resource 
transfers to SSA must be averted and substantial additional resources deployed 
in support of stabilisation, capacity utilisation and rehabilitation. Second, 
debt rescheduling should be carried out on a basis leading to manageable 
interest and repayment profiles for all external obligations including arrears 
even if this requires extended grace periods, very long repayment schedules, 
interest reductions and/or writeoffs. Third, resource transfers should be on 
terms and conditions and for uses consistent with the strategies needed for 
stabilisation - rehabilitation - recovery and renewed development which 
implies a significant reduction in the proportion directed to new capacity 
creating projects and an increase in the share allotted to structural 
adjustment including capacity utilisation and rehabilitation. It also implies 
that as a general rule project and programme finance should cover full direct 
and indirect import costs and in some a proportion of public sector local cost 
requirements as well. Fourth, because the costs of adjustment tend to be 
"front end loaded" (early) and the gains "back end loaded" lagged, external 
finance should be used as one means to make the early costs sustainable and in 
particular to protect vulnerable groups.
- 51 -
Fifth, to the extent that substantial additional disbursements are not 
provided, both the amount and duration of rescheduling and the shift of 
emphasis from new capital projects to capacity utilisation, maintenance and 
rehabilitation support will need to be increased. Neither rescheduling - 
especially for countries such as the Sudan, Ghana, Tanzania with very low 
ratios of present exports to minimum necessary imports cannot make either 
rapid or secure progress toward stabilisation without substantial increases in 
new funds disbursed - nor alteration of uses and increased flexibility can be 
an adequate substitute for increases in funding. However, there is a tradeoff 
of sorts - the less increases in new funding are provided the greater the 
urgency of increased flexibility, reduced project tying and both more and more 
extended debt rescheduling.
It is necessary to approach the struggle toward agendas for SSA stabilisation 
- rehabilitation - recovery - renewed development with a clear realisation of 
how difficult the task will be and how long it is likely to take. Facile 
hopes - and optimistic projections whether of export growth, external resource 
flows or probable results and dates of gains from domestic policy measures - 
have been one of the banes of both internal and external efforts to date; 
dashed hopes and broken efforts have made the current task all the harder.
However, it is equally necessary (at least for those whose interest is more 
than intellectual) to approach the struggle with a belief that something can 
be achieved, that economic malaise can be overcome and political economic 
development renewed. The belief in powerlessness and the certainty of failure 
is almost always self-validating.
Both optimism and pessimism are needed but not the optimism of the intellect 
and pessimism of the will which have characterised too many efforts to date.
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What is needed is pessimism of the intellect (including recognition of past 
errors, especially one's own, and scepticism about the extent of one's 
knowledge and the present perfection of one's measures) and optimism of the 
will. At the least it is possible still to be among or to stand with those 
SSA peasants and workers, intellectuals and managers, businessmen and civil 
servants, community and political leaders who 'remain undefeated ... because 
we have gone on trying'.
Motes
See e.g. World Bank, Toward Sustained Development: A Joint Programme of 
Action for Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, 1984; P. Ndegwa,
L. Mureithi and R.H. Green (editors), Development Options for Africa in 
the 1980s and Beyond, OUP, Nairobi, (in press); C. Allison and R.H. Green 
(editors), Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa - What Agendas 
for Action, IDS Bulletin 14-1, January 1983; World Bank Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, Washington,
1981.
United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs.
This is contrary to the view given in the Bank’s Accelerated Development 
Report (op. cit) and was not identified in earlier critiques of that 
report, e.g. Allison and Green (ojd. cit) ♦
Optimistic in the sense that the global context is likely to be less 
favourable/more unfavourable.
See, e.g. World Bank, World Development Report, 1982, 1983» 1984 and
Toward Sustained Development, op. cit.
cf. e.g. A. Kamarck, Economics of African Development, Pall Mall, London, 
1967, in which he projected 7% trend growth in SSA from the 1970's on.
Zimbabwe macro and sectoral data suggest that with no terms of trade 
changes and a 6% export growth rate plus continued financing for a 
$400-500 million current account deficit, a 4 to 5% GDP growth rate and a 
2 to 3% capacity growth rate could be achieved over 1985-1990 - a better 
result than could reasonably be projected for a majority of SSA 
economists.
Except for children and perhaps women, concern for such groups cannot be 
based primarily on production, let alone surplus generating 
considerations.
Many present transfers are unsuitable because tied to relatively low 
priority capital projects on at too high interest rates/too brief 
repayment periods to be compatible with realistic estimates of transition 
to stabilisation through renewed development. IMF drawings fall in the 
logically unsuitable category both as to terms and as to rates.
Import makeup often needs changing and import to GDP ratios may be 
reduceable, but in a majority of SSA economies almost all non-essential 
and many essential imports have been cut and the import/GDP ratio is 
unsustainably low because maintenance imports are being ’deferred’. As 
G. K. Helleiner has demonstrated SSA economies are very vulnerable to 
import fluctuations and significant declines are almost always 
accompanied by serious overall weakening of their economies. The 
relationship between GDP and imports is two way, stagnation or decline of
*either causes as well as being a result of stagnation or decline of the 
other.
11. Because the growth rates of savings and of exports will need to exceed
that of GDP, consumption growth will be lowered.
12. Toward Sustained Development, op. cit.
13. See ibid and, e.g. "The World Bank's Agenda for the Crises in Agriculture 
and Rural Development in Africa: An Introduction to a Debate" by
J.C.N. Paul and following papers by K.Y. Amoaka and S. Please, R.H. Green 
and M. Schultheis in African Studies Review (forthcoming) and Ndegwa, 
Mureithi, Green, o£. cit.
14. For a fuller discussion see - e.g. - John Williamson, IMF Conditionality, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington, 19 82 especially 
concluding chapter by Williamson and Tanzania chapter by R. H. Green.
15. E.g. in 1983 50 to 75,000 tonnes of (Irish) potatoes - a private sector 
marketed crop - rotted in Tanzania because of lack of buyers and 
transport, thus directly increasing grain import needs by about the same 
amount.
16. Famine relief clearly cannot be seen as a satisfactory permanent answer 
from either the state or the peasant point of view.
17. For a fuller discussion see M. Fransman (editor), Industry and
Accumulation in Africa, Heinemann, London, 1982, especially chapters by
M.A. Bienefeld, A. Coulson, M. Fransman, R.H. Green.
18. This frequently represents a decline from 60 to 70Í capacity utilisation 
rates in the late 1970s.
19. This is particularly true of agricultural research where increasing
financial and personnel support since the 1960s has paralled declining
agricultural output.
20. These are less relevant to profit incomes but are partially so to small 
and medium scale owner/operators.
21. cf. C. Colclough, "Are African governments as unproductive as the 
Accelerated Development Report implies?" in Allison and Green, op. cit.
22. If they are profitable then there is no general case for closing them.
23. E.g. in Tanzania in the middle to late 1970s the large scale public 
enterprise manufacturing sector had higher capacity utilisation ratios 
than the private (IBRD and ILO data) and higher ratios of profits to 
output (admitedly based on company tax data), while in 1983 analysis of 
several major sub-sectors of manufacturing showed substantially higher 
average output value to foreign exchange allocation ratios for public
than for private enterprises. Similarly ratios of growth to retail price 
in private sector marketed staple food crops (e.g. Irish potatoes, 
cooking bananas) do not seem to be higher than for public sector marketed 
grains.
24. For the middle income countries there is little chance of mobilising much 
truly soft finance - 10$ and 5 plus 10 years (e.g. World Bank, some 
export credits) appear to be the best nationally achievable terms for the 
bulk of their external finance, and may be just useable in medium term 
stabilisation through development strategies.
25. The Debt Crisis and the World Economy, London, 1984.
26. The author emphatically does not dissent from this general rejection of
magendo.
27. Sometimes - in a moderately strong economy able to offset the worst costs 
for selected groups, e.g. minimum wage earners and peasants - massive, 
rapid changes can work. In 1974 Tanzania did adjust prices, incomes and 
taxes to 1972-74 oil, grain and general import price increases over six 
months, and then regained rough balance and 10$ inflation within a year.
28. See R. Jolly and G.A. Cornia (editors), The Impact of World Recession on
Children, (World Development 12-3, March 1984) especially articles by
Jolly and Cornia, R.H. Green and H.W. Singer and K. N. Raj.
29. The Debt Crisis, op. cit.
30. Most such fees, taxes and regulations are cost inefficient and control 
inefficient.
31. The World Bank now appears to accept this position and also the need to
devise "cost effective" means to shield vulnerable groups, but has
devoted little attention to defining what that might mean in practice.
32. There are exceptions, and a major present large farm sector should not be 
run down unless and until adequate replacement production has been built 
up.
33* While the World Bank has not overtly proposed this combination of
employment cuts and wage increases, the logic of its present position - 
that public expenditure requires further pruning, employment and wages 
are now too large relative to complementary inputs and that key sector -
e.g. health, education, agricultural research - wages and salaries are
often too low to provide adequate incentives - would seem to lead to it.
34. At least one would like to hope they do! Some do not - they recognise it
and seek to use this applied political economic prescriptions to secure 
basic political change. This may well be defensible in respect to
regimes such as those of Nguema, Amin, Bokasa, Botha (in South Africa or 
a_ fortiori Namibia) but appears to be used rather more widely.
The diversity here is - or should be largely temperal. Ghana - if a 
dynamic of recovery and of hope could lead to an ingathering of its 
widely dispersed personpower - needs far less, far less generalised and 
far less long stay personnel and more specialised and selective knowledge 
inputs than Tanzania, Tanzania than Botswana and Botswana than Namibia at 
independence. Similarly a new sector or project - e.g. petrochemicals in 
Mozambique, railway operation in Botswana, oil production in the Cameroon 
- initially needs far more external knowledge and personnel inputs than 
it should a decade after its establishment - e.g. any of those sectors in 
Algeria.
